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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jeremiah Spicer appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation. He also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his 
motion to augment the appellate record. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Spicer had sex with a 14-year-old girl who had run away from home. (PSI, 
pp.265-2671.) The state charged him with statutory rape. (R., pp.59-60.) Spicer 
p!ed guilty to the charge. (R., p.77.) The district court imposed a unified 15-year 
sentence with six years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Spicer on 
probation for 20 years. (R., pp.77-84.) 
Approximately a year later, the state filed a motion for probation violation. 
(R., pp.109-113.) Spicer admitted violating his probation by consuming alcohol, 
using methamphetamine multiple times, engaging in unauthorized sexual 
relationships, and by possessing pornography. (R., pp.109-113, 120.) The 
district court revoked Spicer's probation, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.128-
130.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended 
Spicer's sentence and placed him back on probation. (R., pp.138-142.) 
Approximately a year and a half later, the state filed a second motion for 
probation violation. (R., pp.158-167.) Spicer admitted he violated his probation 
by being removed from the LIFE, Inc. residential treatment program fo·r non-
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"SpicerPSI. pdf." 
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compliance with program rules, and by accessing the internet without 
authorization. (R., pp.158-167, 172; Tr., p.1, L.4 - p.12, L.4.) The district court 
revoked Spicer's probation and executed the previously imposed sentence. (R., 
pp.174-177.) Spicer timely appealed. (R., pp.176-180.) 
Spicer then filed an amended notice of appeal requesting the preparation 
of transcripts of various hearings conducted prior to his second probation 
violation. (5/15/13 Amended Notice of Appeal.) The state objected to the notice, 
and the district court denied the transcript requests. (5/24/13 Objection; 6/10/13 
district court "Order Denying Request For Certain Transcripts at Public Expense 
on Appeal.") After the appellate record was settled, Spicer moved to augment 
the record with most of the previously-requested and still-unprepared transcripts. 
(7/15/13 Motion.) The state objected, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied the 
motion. (7/17/13 Objection; 7/29/13 Order.) The Idaho Supreme Court also 
denied Spicer's subsequent renewed motion to augment the record. (9/9/13 
Motion; 10/15/13 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Spicer states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Spicer due 
process and equal protection when it denied his motion to 
augment the record with transcripts necessarily for review of 
the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
revoked Mr. Spicer's probation, or, alternatively, when it 
executed his sentence without modification when it did so. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Spicer failed to show that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record? 
2. Has Spicer failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Spicer Has Failed To Show That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record 
Introduction 
Spicer contends that by denying his motion to augment appellate 
record with as-yet-unprepared transcripts of various hearings conducted prior to 
his second probation violation, the Idaho Supreme Court 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has 
his 
him 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-23.) Spicer 
has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. 2 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
2 Additionally, should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, that 
Court lacks the authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny 
Spicer's motion. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 620, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. 
App. 2012). In Morgan, the Idaho Court of Appeals "disclaim[ed] any authority to 
review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a 
motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on 
the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal 
constitutions or other law." kl Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would 
be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court.!' kl 
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C. Spicer Is Not Constitutionally Entitled To The Requested Transcripts 
Spicer argues that he is entitled to transcripts of various hearings 
conducted prior to his second probation violation because, he claims, the failure 
to provide them is a violation of his constitutional rights to due process, equal 
protection, and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appeilant's Brief, 
pp.6-23.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently rejected similar arguments in State 
v. Brunet, 2013 WL 6001894 (Idaho 2013). 3 
In Brunet, the Court stated: "When an indigent defendant requests that 
transcripts be created and incorporated into a record on appeal, the grounds of 
the appeal must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet 
at 3 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicaao, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971)). "[C]olorable 
need is a matter of law determined by the court based upon the facts exhibited." 
lfL. In order to show a colorable need, an appellant must show "the requested 
transcripts contained specific information relevant to [the] appeal." lfL. 
"[H]ypothesiz[ing] that the lack of ... transcripts could prevent [the appellant] 
from determining whether there were additional issues to raise, or whether there 
was factual information contained in the transcripts that might relate to his 
arguments" does not demonstrate a "colorable need." In other words, an 
appellant is not entitled to transcripts in order to "search the transcripts for a 
reason to request and incorporate the transcripts in the first place." lfL. Such an 
endeavor is a "'fishing expedition' at taxpayer expense" - an exercise the 
constitution does not endorse. In short, "[m]ere speculation or hope that 
3 Spicer did not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Brunet when he wrote 
his brief. 
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something exists does not amount to the appearance or semblance of specific 
information necessary to establish a colorable need." kl 
Spicer contends that transcripts from his original change of plea hearing, 
original sentencing hearing, the admit/deny hearing from his first probation 
violation, the disposition hearing from his first probation violation, and his rider 
review hearing are relevant, regardless of whether they have been prepared or 
not, because "a district court is not limited to considering only that information 
offered at the hearing from which the appeal was filed" and that "the applicable 
standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into the 
events which occurred prior to, as well as the events which occurred during, the 
probation revocation proceedings." (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) It does not 
follow however, that an appellant who appeals a post-judgment revocation of 
probation has an automatic constitutional entitlement to a transcript of every 
hearing conducted throughout the entirety of a criminal case. 
Although the appellate court's review of a sentence is independent, the 
review is limited, as noted in Brunet, to the "entire record available to the trial 
court at sentencing." 2013 WL 6001894 at 4 (citing State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 
5, 244 P.3d 145, 149 (2010)). As in Brunet, the record in this case contains a 
voluminous amount of relevant sentencing materials including two presentence 
reports, relevant police and probation reports, and multiple psychological 
evaluations and incident reports from treatment providers and rehabilitative 
programs. (See PSI.) The record also includes minutes from each of the 
hearings from which Spicer has requested a transcript. (R., pp.57-58, 74-75, 
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124-127, 135-136.) "Therefore, the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing is contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at 4. As such, 
Spicer "has failed to demonstrate that he was denied due process or equal 
protection by this Court's refusal to order the creation of transcripts at taxpayer 
expense in order to augment the record on appeal." lit 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of 
probation, Spicer has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here. 
There is nothing provided by Spicer that would indicate that what happened at 
the prior hearings, held betvveen two and four years before the issuance of the 
decisions that are at issue on appeal, was considered or played any role in the 
district court's decision to revoke his probation. Spicer has not attempted to 
specuiate as to why, specifically, these transcripts are relevant to his arguments 
on appeal (other than asserting, in general terms, that a district court may 
theoretically consider statements made at previous hearings when making 
sentencing determinations), much less demonstrate a colorable need for the 
requested transcripts. As such, Spicer's motions to augment the record with 
these transcripts constitute an impermissible "fishing expedition." See Brunet at 
3. 
Spicer next argues that "effective counsel cannot be given in the absence 
of access to the relevant transcripts." (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) This argument 
also fails. Addressing the claim that "refusal to order the creation of the 
requested transcripts for incorporation into the record" results in the 
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"prospective[]" denial of the effective assistance of counsel, the Court in Brunet 
concluded Brunet "failed to demonstrate how his counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness without the requested 
transcripts," noting "the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing is 
contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at 5. The same is true in this 
case. "This record meets [Spicer's] right to a record sufficient to afford adequate 
and effective appellate review." kl As such, Spicer has failed to show a Sixth 
Amendment violation based on the partial denial of his motion to augment. 
Because Spicer failed to show a "colorable need" for any of the transcripts 
he was denied, assuming this Court addresses his claims that the denial of his 
motion to augment with those transcripts violated his constitutional rights, his 
claims fail. 
11. 
Spicer has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A Introduction 
Spicer contends the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation, or alternatively, by declining to reduce his sentence upon revocation. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.23-29.) A review of the record and the applicable legal 
standards demonstrates that the district court acted well within its sentencing 
discretion considering the serious nature of Spicer's underlying crime and his 
demonstrated inability to comply with the requirements of community supervision. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a 
showing that the trial court abused its discretion." Morgan, 153 Idaho at 622, 288 
P.3d at 839. "Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. 
Wersland, 125 ldaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Revoking Spicer's Probation Or 
By Declining To Reduce Spicer's Sentence Upon Revocation 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260,261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to 
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the 
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ot. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed, or may reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); 
State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A 
court's decision whether to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of 
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discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a 
sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those 
standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of 
the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal 
punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). 
Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual 
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment 
or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 
730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing 
events before and after the original judgment," i.e., "facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 29, 218 
P.3d at 8. 
In this case, the district court decided to revoke Spicer's probation and to 
execute the underlying sentence without reduction after reviewing the case 
history, the presentence reports, and other relevant sentencing materials. (R., 
pp.174-177; Tr., p.15, L.7 - p.20, L.12.) This determination was reasonable in 
light of the serious nature of the underlying crime and Spicer's continued 
demonstrated inability to comply with the rules of community supervision. 
When the district court gave Spicer a second chance at probation after the 
period of retained jurisdiction, it made it explicitly clear that it would not give 
Spicer a third chance should he continue to violate probation rules. The court 
amended "Special Condition 24" to read: "Defendant has had prior opportunities 
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for probation and a rider. The Defendant is advised that this is [his] final 
opportunity at probation. Failure to abide by the conditions of probation resulting 
in a motion for probation violation, wiil, if proven or admitted, be considered a 
violation of a fundamental condition of probation which will result either [sic] in 
imposition of the underlying sentence." (R, pp.139-140 (emphasis in original).) 
In the course of this "final opportunity," Spicer continued to violate the 
terms of his probation. Numerous incident reports complied by empioyees of 
LIFE, Inc., the residential treatment program Spicer was ordered to participate in, 
document Spicer's issues controlling his anger and complying with program 
rules. (PSI, pp.53-80.) As summarized by his probation officer: 
Mr. Spicer continues to violate LIFE, Inc[.] rules as well as 
probation and parole rules. He claims he no longer wants to be in 
the community, feels he'd do better in a confined environment. He 
continues to show irresponsibility when given the opportunity to 
[prove] he can be self[-]sufficient and make the right choices. He 
deliberately is making these choices to violate his supervision, as 
he is aware that is the only way to get out of the LIFE, Inc[.] 
program. His aggression has increased and his ability to control his 
aggressions [is] decreasing. He threatens LIFE staff, flees without 
permission, does not obey lawful orders established by his 
supervising officers, and utilizes the internet, text message and 
picture mail as well as unauthorized relationships. With the 
defendant[']s increase in aggression, [and] desire to not be in the 
community he is a danger to himself and the community. 
(R., pp.165-166.) 
In addition to his issues complying with the rules of the LIFE, Inc. 
program, Spicer has admitted violating the terms of his probation by consuming 
alcohol, using methamphetamine multiple times, engaging in unauthorized 
sexual relationships, possessing pornography, and by accessing the internet 
without permission. (R., pp.109-113, 120, 158-167, 172.) 
11 
In iight of Spicer's continued inability to comply with the rules of 
community supervision, and the serious nature of the underlying charge of 
statutory rape, the district court's decision to revoke Spicer's probation and 
execute the underlying sentence without reduction was entirely reasonable. 
Spicer has therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Spicer's probation and executing the originally-imposed sentence. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2014. 
~~~ 
MARK Vv. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of January, 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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